Carlos III had championed a cause already lost. Quebec had fallen before the Compact was signed. Humiliation for Spain was inevitable, and inch by inch she yielded her claims. Grimaldi at first denounced the cession of Louisiana to England; resistance being futile, he proposed a neutral zone west of the Alleghanies to keep England from the Gulf. Next he was ready to yield Georgia, with a "reasonable" boundary on the south— presumably the Altamaha. Then Havana fell, and the vise tightened. England offered to restore Havana in exchange for Florida or Puerto Rico. Florida could be spared better than the island. But to cede it would give England control of the Gulf and the Bahama Channel, the evil Spain had so long resisted. To save Florida for Spain, therefore, France offered England all of Louisiana. But England preferred Florida, and took it. La Florida was gone; with it vanished all of Spain's claims to Georgia. Ostensibly to compensate Spain for her loss, France now gave Spain western Louisiana, which England had rejected. Reluctantly she accepted it.1 [Note 1 For a discussion of the Louisiana cession, see Shepherd, in Political Science Quarterly, XIX, 439-158. For the treaty of Paris, February 10, 1763, see MacDonald, W., Select Charters and Other Documents Illustrative of American History (New York, 1906), 261-267.]