Still under no pressure from Oglethorpe, Montiano’s men remained on Saint Simon’s for over a week following the disaster at Bloody Marsh. They might have stayed even longer had it not been for a piece of alarming news gleaned from a French prisoner-of-war. This Frenchman informed Montiano that Oglethorpe, who had assembled a force of 1,000, was planning a major attack on the Spanish positions on the southern tip of Saint Simon’s as soon as he received aid from Boston, which was expected momentarily. The Spaniards might have ignored these statements, but when five English sail appeared on the horizon at noon on July 24, Montiano became panicky and immediately convoked a junta of his chief officers. They voted to leave Saint Simon’s at once, recommending a retreat along the coastal channel in order to destroy the English outposts of San Pedro and Saint Andrews on Cumberland Island. On July 25 these officers began embarking their 1,500 troops on the waiting ships, a process which was not finally completed until July 26. On their way south the fleet paused long enough to destroy the two English blockhouses on Cumberland Island, and by August 1, 1742, most of Montiano’s force was back in Saint Augustine. The remainder of the fleet under Arredondo and Rubiani cHose to ride a favorable wind back to Cuba. In his report to the king Montiano found many excuses for his failure to take Frederica. He declared that he did not have enough supplies to sustain his troops during a prolonged campaign and that the failure of 13 vessels carrying men and supplies to reach Florida had greatly hindered his efforts. Montiano also feared the onset of the hurricane season, which he felt might cause serious losses to his men. The Florida governor pointed out, too, that Guemes had enjoyed him not to jeopardize the welfare and safety of his men. In Montiano’s judgment destruction of the expeditionary force would have left both Saint Augustine and Havana completely defenseless. Besides, he had devastated the forts and fields surrounding Frederica and inflicted damage on Georgia estimated at 300,000 pesos. Montiano had also managed to keep his entire force intact, except for the losses at Bloody Marsh. The king’s secretary, Jose de Campillo, refused to accept Montiano’s excuses and blamed the failure entirely on the governor. Campillo wrote Guemes that he was completely satisfied with the measures taken by the Cuban governor to insure the success of the expedition, but Montiano’s “poor leadership, lack of diligence, and inefficiency” were deplorable. The Florida governor had the most to gain from the offensive, yet he was the principal cause of its failure. Campillo was probably right; extreme timidity had cost Montiano a victory. He had refused to take advantage of his superiority and had allowed the disaster at Bloody Marsh to cast an enervating spell over his expedition. (Tepaske GSF)