Incidents like these [attempted English invasions in 9/1742] kept the Floridians continually tense and anxious and particularly susceptible to rumors. Any word of an English military activity in Boston, Jamaica, Antigua, Charleston, or any other part of English America was interpreted in Florida as a buildup against Saint Augustine. For the most part such fears were groundless, but they prompted considerable defensive activity in Saint Augustine. Late in 1742 and early in 1743, for example, Montiano became convinced that the English were preparing a new assault on his colony and made feverish preparations to meet it. He bolstered the fortifications at Fort San Marcos, mounted six cannon along the San Sebastian River, and erected a stone fort at Matanzas Point. This was typical of Montiano’s strategy. After Bloody Marsh he contented himself with strengthening the defenses of his colony. Since 1687 Fort San Marcos had served the Spaniards well, and Montiano knew it. In 1743 an English officer observed that the Indians serving under Montiano had great contempt for him because he refused to move out of Saint Augustine to fight the English and their Indians. The officer, however, had more respect for the Florida governor. He believed that Montiano, a shrewd tactician, was slyly waiting for Oglethorpe to put himself in an untenable position. Once the Georgian made a mistake, Montiano would strike decisively against the English. Apparently, though, the governor had had enough of offensive war at Bloody Marsh. (Tepaske GSF)